During a meeting on February 3, 1998, the FBI requested specific examples of criminal activity at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) regarding the lack of an asbestos control program at the Kesselring Site Operations (KSO). This letter presents detailed information about long term negligence in asbestos control, and violations of Federal asbestos regulations, at the (KSO), located in West Milton, New York, and of the coverup thereof, as contained in the General Accounting Office (GAO) report issued following review of that facility by the GAO.

The FBI, as expected, ignored the information and has, to date, refused to investigate the lack of an asbestos control program at the site. The former business agent for the Union representing organized labor at the KSO has in his possession a list identifying the numbers and names of people who either have been diagnosed with asbestosis or who have died as a result of asbestos exposure. This list also contains a tabulation of the numbers and names of those individuals who have been exposed to excess levels of radiation.

The General Electric Company, Naval Reactors and the DOE meanwhile continue to hide behind a myriad of laws set up to protect contractors involved in all aspects of the Nuclear Industry. The Naval Reactor Program continues to proclaim that the program is exempt from oversight by virtue of an executive order written by President Reagan in 1982. The Order is known as Executive Order 12344. A review of the Order shows no exemption from oversight either implied or stated. The order does, in fact imply, that the NR program should at least meet or exceed the criteria established for all similar activities in the Country. KSO does not even come close to meeting minimum standards established for all other facilities.

I have received a letter from the organization that oversees the FBI [U. S. Department of Justice - Office of Professional Responsibility] dated November 2 1998 which states that:

" United States Attorneys are vested with broad discretionary authority in determining whether alleged violations of federal law should be pursued. In the absence of specific information showing that that authority has been corruptly, or otherwise inappropriately, exercised, this office will not review decisions made pursuant to that authority".

in other words if its an agency sponsored by the federal government we are not going to investigate. An individual citizen, however, is prohibited from disposing of waste of virtually any type on his own property. Try it --- if your caught you will probably go to jail.

April 1, 1998

John P. Shannon
262 Jones Road
Saratoga Springs, NY 12866

Mr. Michael Bassett, Special Agent for the FBI

Mr. Robert P. Storch, Assistant US Attorney

James T. Foley U.S. Court House

445 Broadway, Albany, NY 12207-2924
518-465-7551
518-431-7463(F)

Dear Mr. Bassett:

During a meeting on February 3, 1998, you requested specific examples of criminal activity at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL). This letter presents detailed information about long term negligence in asbestos control, and violations of Federal asbestos regulations, at the Kesselring Site Operation (KSO), located in West Milton, New York, and of the coverup thereof, as contained in the General Accounting Office (GAO) report issued following review of that facility.

Background: Between 1950 and 1972, Naval Reactors (NR) constructed four nuclear power plants at the KSO for nuclear propulsion research and for training of Navy crews for the nuclear fleet. Many large buildings, for administration and support, were added during this period, and in later years. A boiler house served as the central source of heat for these facilities. Asbestos insulated steam lines from the boiler crisscrossed the KSO site, running outdoors to all buildings on overhead suspension hangers, and then continuing inside each building to the individual heating units. At least two of the four prototype power plants also contained extensive footage of steam piping insulated by asbestos. From original installation too shortly before arrival of the General Accounting Office (GAO) review team, this asbestos was neglected and ignored by Naval Reactor and contractor management. The lagging deteriorated, disintegrated, and was damaged over the years, eliciting hundreds of grievances from the local union. The great majority of these complaints were dismissed in a cursory manner by the Schenectady Naval Reactors Office (SNR), with no significant corrective action ever being taken. A 1985 annual safety inspection of the KSO site found that employee asbestos exposure records were grievously incomplete, as well as falsified. In 1986 the U.S. Navy demanded an inquiry into KSO activities after sailors complained of lack of asbestos control in the prototypes. The subsequent investigation by Schenectady Naval Reactors Office (SNR) found that essentially no asbestos control program existed at KSO. In 1987, the New York State Health Department agreed to conduct an epidemiological study of the KSO because of the large number of employee deaths caused by asbestosis and cancer, a study that was inexplicably canceled in 1997. A 1989 survey of the KSO site found that more than 4.5 miles of asbestos lagged piping existed, in a serious state of disrepair. The alleged asbestos violations at KSO, along with numerous other safety issues, lead Congressman Mike Synar to request a GAO review of the environment, health, and safety practices at the Department of Energy's Naval Reactor Program facilities (see report GAO/RECD-91-157).

Major asbestos violations continued at KSO during the time of the GAO review, but apparently escaped the notice of the GAO team. In 1991, a ten year, $30 million, asbestos removal program began at the KSO site, a project categorized by one national asbestos expert as the largest of its kind, by far, ever undertaken in the U.S.

The GAO report: For whatever reason, the GAO team chose to focus on the state of KSO asbestos control at the time of review, rather than on the alleged long term negligence of asbestos control, even though KSO documents, worker testimony, ongoing asbestos violations, and a worker death list, were available to verify the charge. The GAO report purposely trivialized a major NAVY confrontation with Naval Reactors which revealed that no asbestos control program was in place, or could have been in place for years. In addition, the GAO report failed to identify a subsequent crucial KSO asbestos survey that found 4.5 miles of asbestos in a very severe state of disrepair and disintegration a situation that could have developed only after years of negligence by Naval Reactors as is consistent with the previously noted lack of any asbestos control program. The omission of relevant evidence and the inclusion of misinformation in the GAO report, in and of itself, demands full investigation and, where warranted, prosecution of those supplying such false information to the U.S. government. Furthermore, the GAO report, which has been repeatedly used in courts of law, before Congress, in environmental hearings, and other defenses of the Naval Reactors program, is a travesty that must be recalled. Details of falsification follow, with italics identifying our comments concerning Federal asbestos regulations and GAO statements.

FEDERAL OSHA ASBESTOS STANDARDS:

Regulations for asbestos control at any facility containing asbestos are given, in part, in 29 C.F.R. 1910. This document requires that regulated (demarcated) areas be established even when the possibility exists that asbestos control standards may be violated and that each employer who has a workplace or work operation covered by this standard . . . shall perform initial and periodic monitoring of employees who are, or may reasonably be expected to be exposed to airborne concentrations at or above the TWA permissible exposure limit and/or excursion limit.

The 1986 NAVY asbestos debacle revealed that no asbestos control program was practiced at KSO and also revealed the reason . . . no one in KSO management was certified, or ever had been certified, in asbestos control. Contrary to the GAO characterization as a major lapse, this was business as usual at KSO . . . as it had been for 45 years.

Based on the alarming results of the 1988 KSO asbestos survey, there is absolutely no doubt that every KSO employee, approximately 2500 civilian and military personnel, was at risk from chronic asbestos exposure. Despite this, no asbestos monitoring of employees ever occurred at KSO. The entire KSO site should have been declared a "Regulated Area." The fact that the GAO ignored the 1988 KSO asbestos survey and instead saw fit to take air samples after some of the 4.5 miles of deteriorated asbestos had been repaired is nothing short of ludicrous.

Two documents have been published regarding the lack of concern, of GE/NR/SNR/DOE, to asbestos exposure for all KSO employees. These are: (1) Report from T. Carpenter, Esq. to A. Seepo, dated June 5,1990, and (2) A Report entitled "Cleanup or Coverup" by T. Carpenter and Roberta Valente, dated July 21, 1989. Both of these documents may be made available upon request.

The GAO report states: "The programs and procedures implemented by Naval Reactors and its contractors at the laboratories and prototype training sites are adequate to protect workers from asbestos." (Page 2) and, "The asbestos controls and procedures implemented at Naval Reactors laboratories meet federal standards and in some cases exceed the standards." (Page 24).

What Naval Reactors considers "implemented" and what actually went into practice at KSO are two quite different matters. A program on paper is not a program in practice. There was plenty of evidence available to the GAO proving that the programs and procedures referred to did not protect the KSO workers including the death list of 180 union employees (minimum) who have succumbed to either cancer or asbestosis. Naval Reactors has operated the KSO site without a functioning asbestos control program for 45 years, thereby endangering the health and safety of both contractor employees and Navy personnel. In spite of the obvious need based on the enormous amount of asbestos present Naval Reactors failed, or refused, to employ certified asbestos experts capable of putting such a program into practice. Naval Reactors has managed long term circumvention of asbestos control, and most other

State and Federal safety regulations, by the subterfuge of stonewalling any attempts of independent oversight. The 1986 NAVY asbestos debacle and the 1989 asbestos survey provide irrefutable evidence that the programs and procedures used by Naval Reactors were not what they claimed. The paper programs and procedures no doubt looked good at the time of the GAO review as did the overall asbestos condition at KSO, as it should after the first ever site-wide repair effort in 1989. However, the state of the asbestos program in 1990-91 was irrelevant to the allegation.

THE 1986 NAVY DEBACLE - NO KSO ASBESTOS CONTROL PROGRAM

The GAO reports that: ". . . asbestos incidents have been reported, and at the Knolls laboratory a major lapse in asbestos control was experienced in 1986." (24), and "During our review, we found one serious incident, over the past 20 years, involving asbestos that resulted in exposures exceeding federal limits at Naval Reactors-operated facilities." (Page 25), and "The incident occurred during a 3-month period in 1986, in which Navy personnel were assigned to remove asbestos at Knolls' Kesselring site." (Page 25), and "During the work, airborne asbestos was discovered that exceeded federal exposure standards." (Page 26)

These several sentences of spin applied to the 1986 NAVY asbestos debacle at KSO are nothing short of ingenuous. The matter was certainly MAJOR but it was no LAPSE. Webster defines "lapse" as "a temporary decline from an accepted condition." The accepted condition never existed. What surfaced at KSO in 1986 was discovery that no asbestos control program existed in practice. The U.S. Navy went ballistic on learning of the asbestos abuse and mistreatment of its sailors by Naval Reactors. An investigation was ordered by the Division of Naval Personnel, because of the seriousness of the incident.

Further, the GAO report indicates that the problem was that during the work, airborne asbestos was discovered that exceeded federal exposure standards. However, this was not just a matter of a few excess asbestos fibers in the air. Far from it. The principal revelation of the 1986 NAVY debacle was that no asbestos program existed at KSO and that no one at the KSO site was qualified in asbestos control. The 1986 findings verify that KSO was operating in violation of all Federal asbestos standards as had been the case for 45 years.

The GAO reports that: "The board concluded that the incident was caused by fundamental weaknesses in Knolls' methods for planning, performing, and controlling asbestos." (Page 26)

This innocuous statement conceals a ton of underlying enlightenment. A thirty-four (34) page investigative report, with eight appendices, found that:

1. Required KSO asbestos audits were not performed.

2. Management attention to KSO asbestos work requirements simply did not exist.

3. KSO asbestos controls training given to Navy asbestos workers was of poor quality and inadequate scope.

4. KSO asbestos control requirements did not require that supervisors be qualified asbestos workers.

(a)Mgr. Safety, Environment/Special Projects - no asbestos training

(b)Mgr. Safety and Health - no asbestos training

(c)KSO Industrial Hygienist - no asbestos training

(d)Industrial Hygienist - no asbestos training

(e)Incident Prevention Captains - knowledge inadequate to complete asbestos work permits

(f)S3G Plant Management and Supervision - none qualified as asbestos workers or authorized to enter asbestos work areas to observe and supervise operations.

5. Failure of KAPL management to inspect and audit the asbestos work was a major contributing factor in the potential over exposures of S3G crew members to asbestos.

The GAO report characterization of the 1986 Navy debacle as a lapse implies that prior to those three (3) months all of these management and safety personnel had training in asbestos control and a legitimate asbestos control program was in place and practiced at KSO. The workers know better those who are still alive. This GAO finding actually verifies the allegation that KSO was operating in violation of Federal asbestos standards, for 45 years.

The GAO reports that, "The board made numerous recommendations to correct the weaknesses, including: establishing an asbestos work control program, revising training programs for asbestos workers, developing a documentation system " (Page 26)

The board actually made 32 specific recommendations as to KSO needs in asbestos control covering responsibilities, work controls, training, respiratory protection, asbestos monitoring, audits/inspections, the Safety Office, and personnel exposure, dispelling any doubt that KSO had even a semblance of a functioning asbestos control program in place at the time of the 1986 NAVY debacle. The 32 specific recommendations by SNR actually verify that KSO was operating in violation of all Federal asbestos standards as had been the case for 45 years.

THE 1989 KSO ASBESTOS SURVEY - 4.5 MILES OF ASBESTOS PERILS AND VIOLATIONS

The GAO report states that: " in anticipation of more stringent federal requirements, Naval Reactors is planning a comprehensive asbestos removal program." (Page 24), and "The Knolls laboratory plan, estimated to cost $30 million over 10 years ." (Page 27)

Since KSO was not meeting the existing less stringent Federal requirements, it is curious that they were concerned about meeting more stringent requirements. The timing of the KSO asbestos abatement program was more likely due to a number of factors the advent of major media coverage of KSO safety issues in 1987, word from Washington concerning a probable Congressional investigation, the 1986 Navy asbestos debacle, and the fact that asbestos deterioration at KSO had finally become so alarming, that further coverup by Naval Reactors was seen to be a very high risk to their program.

An SNR letter issued in late 1988 addresses the KSO asbestos control and removal plan. A few pertinent statements from this document follow:

"Indoor piping and components identified in Attachment (B) have not been maintained or repaired and exhibit many areas of deterioration. The condition of this piping mandates immediate repair action and subsequent removal."

" concentrating on repair of damaged asbestos in occupied office/working spaces and high traffic areas, needs to be implemented quickly."

"Being classrooms, offices and high traffic areas, lagging repairs should be accomplished early in the program."

A listing attached to this letter, of outdoor lagging repairs, totals to 3300 ft of piping for wet-

cloth, wrapping and taping in addition to many expansion joints, isolated areas, elbows and miscellaneous sections. Descriptions of the state of the disrepair of these areas include: bad condition, damaged lagging, some damage, heavy damage, etc. A listing of indoor lagging work identified 753 areas in need of repairs and 15,950 ft of asbestos for removal.

Note that the asbestos abatement program was just being initiated in late 1988, that's 3 years after the 1985 KSO safety audit found serious deficiencies in the asbestos control program, and 2 years after the 1986 Navy asbestos debacle at KSO. This delay supports the thesis that something more threatening and ominous finally forced Naval Reactors to move. The SNR statement that, "Indoor piping and components have not been maintained or repaired and exhibit many areas of deterioration.", along with the type and enormity of needed repairs, in and of itself provides proof that Naval Reactor/General Electric management never gave attention to asbestos control or to protection of the workers. Apparently, the GAO was not privy to this important evidence.

The GAO reports: "The physical inspections of the facilities noted torn asbestos wrapping on pipes and other instances of exposed asbestos. According to our Manager for Health and Safety, these instances are typical for facilities of the size inspected and appeared to be the result of normal operations. Unless the asbestos is disturbed inadvertently or during operation or maintenance activities, it poses no hazard to employees." (Page 27)

As indicated previously, the KSO asbestos mess had undergone frantic repair and upgrading before the GAO arrived. The torn asbestos wrapping on pipes and other instances of exposed asbestos, as observed by the GAO, was just the tip of the iceberg, i.e. what was missed during the face lift scramble. In any case, the logic, and rationalization, of the GAO Manager for Health and Safety is nothing less than bizarre. There were then, and are now, Federal regulations regarding damaged asbestos in the work place. There is no Federal waiver for damage based on the size of the facility nor any waiver because damage was from normal operation.

The GAO reports that: "Knolls and its sites exceed OSHA standards in several areas. OSHA and EPA allow the use of half-face respirators in certain situations while the Knolls program only permits the use of full-face respirator equipment." (Page 25)

The 1985 Annual Safety Audit found that KSO asbestos records were falsified including false indication that workers exposed to asbestos were supplied with air and air purifying respirators. The 1986 Navy asbestos debacle at KSO resulted in an investigative report that found the following: "Half-face respirators for work protection were chosen based on previous work history at the site The more protective full flow air-supplied respirators should have been chosen. The use of half-face respirators for asbestos work should be discontinued." Thus, it is obvious why and when the Knolls exceeded this OSHA standard for 4 years at most, while the preceding 40 years are ignored. This kudos, and others in the GAO report, is unwarranted and irrelevant, and does nothing to answer the allegation.

Summary: The GAO investigation apparently placed emphasis on the current state of asbestos control at KSO, by visual inspection and by air sampling for asbestos fiber. Their so called review of records, which only uncovered one serious lapse in 20 years, seems to have overlooked hundreds of union grievances concerning KSO asbestos hazards beginning in the 50's, a 1985 safety audit that found KSO asbestos record keeping to be seriously flawed and falsified, and a 1988 description of asbestos conditions at KSO that is truly alarming. Obviously, the 1986 Navy asbestos debacle was too big to coverup. Of course, the bottom line, and the real measure of the effectiveness of the KSO asbestos control program is the unions death list 180 workers sacrificed to cancer and/or asbestosis. This, too, failed to warrant mention in the GAO report.

The 1986 NAVY asbestos debacle constitutes prima facie evidence that GE/NR/SNR/DOE management knowingly, and willfully, failed to practice asbestos control at KSO. The 1989 KSO asbestos survey constitutes prima facie evidence that GE/NR/SNR/DOE management knowingly, and willfully, made false claims as to the KSO asbestos history. These false claims are sufficient cause to recall the GAO report and to bring charges against appropriate GE/NR/SNR/DOE management for flagrant violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001, 18 U.S.C. 1516, 40 U.S.C. 333, The Clean Air Act, The Clean Water Act, and, perhaps, the Federal Civil False Claims Act (Qui Tam).

John P. Shannon, Major USMCR (R)
Former Manager of Nuclear Criticality Safety, Industrial Hygiene and Industrial Safety
& Nuclear Reactor Physicist
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

AND

Robert Stater
Licensed Nuclear Engineer

cc:/ Senator Orin Hatch (R-Utah)
Senate Judiciary Committee
131 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510