June 5, 1990

Mr. A.R. Seepo, Director
Radiological / Environmental Control & Safety Division
U.S. Department of Energy
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office
P.O. Box 1069

Schenectady, NY

Dear Mr. Seepo

We are responding on behalf of Mr. Douglas Allen to your recent correspondence wherein you requested that Mr. Allen supply Schenectady Naval Reactors with KAPL worker statements in Mr. Allen's possession.(Attachments 1, 2 and 3). As you are well aware, Mr. Allen collected these statements at the direction of his attorneys for purposes relating to litigation challenging KAPL's September 15, 1988 security newsletter. Specifically, these statements allege in general terms that the worker was aware of serious or potentially serious matters relating to health and safety at KAPL, and that because of the September 15,1988 security newsletter, felt constrained from raising these concerns to outside agencies or organizations.

I must emphasize to you that these statements were collected for the purpose of showing to the court the impact of the security newsletter on constitutionally-protected activity. Furthermore, because of a widely perceived pattern of harassment and retaliation against workers who raise safety allegations outside of the program, the statements were collected with an explicit promise of confidentiality.

Mr. Allen has informed union members of their duty to bring forth, in some manner, any outstanding concerns which could imminently impact on worker health or safety and the environment. It is his understanding that the employees already had voiced these concerns to supervisors in the filed, with no constructive results. Any effort made to coerce Mr. Allen in breaching his promises of confidentiality would further exacerbate the loss of worker confidence in SNR.

Frankly, such confidence in SNR's integrity for maintaining confidentiality could hardly be lower, based on its historical record of retaliation against workers for raising concerns, as well as its record in divulging the names of workers who complain to the contractor. For example, we note that Frank Bordell was disciplined by his supervisor within one hour of his report of potential radiation over-exposures to Mr. Vodapivc of your office (SNR). To further expound, I draw your attention to Attachment 4 to this letter, an internal contractor document dated April 29, 1978 wherein the manager of Employee Relations for GE, Mr. J.C. Vanselow wrote to the manager of Plant Employee Relations, Mr. C.H. Turner. In that letter, Mr. Vanselow states that Navy Nuclear Reactors demanded that the contractor punish union personnel for safety reporting. On page 2 of the letter, under section I., the letter states:

Navy Nuclear Reactors believes that:

-Unrest among craft personnel, i.e., the unions representing them, poses a threat to the NR Program. (Ice falling off the Hortonsphere incidents, union resistance to the "no-crafts in-hull" directive, visits to Congressman Stratton, etc.)

-The solution to "labor problems" is to reduce the numbers of personnel in the offending classifications and increase the subcontracting until there is a realization by these people that their jobs are dependent on increased productivity and diminished actions of a threatening nature.

Navy Nuclear Reactors has requested, or directed, that KAPL:

- Reduce the number of GE crafts at KSO.

- Improve the productivity of these craft personnel who remain at KSO.

- Substantially increase subcontracting.

The coercive nature of Naval Reactors' management of the contractor was made clear in the next paragraph:

KAPL management believes that:

-Because of the contractual rights of the parties (especially as they relate to headcount and funding), the history of KAPL compliance with the Customer's desires, the Company's vulnerability to adverse publicity and the potential loss of Navy business to other Company components, we have no viable options other than compliance.

- The major cause of low productivity is management inadequacies - - especially the lack of a work-to-be accomplished versus resources available planning procedure that will allow personnel resources to be sequentially allocated to the highest priority work . . . Poor prior planning is also a contributing cause of low productivity, e.g., when the manpower is staged to perform a specific task, the materials and/or tools are not available, the preparatory procedures (e.g. radcon checkout) have not been accomplished, etc.

The letter openly discusses the possibility of strike actions resulting from the Naval Reactor's directive to retaliate against KAPL union members for safety reports and visits to Congressmen, and balances the options against Naval Reactor's displeasure. (See page 4). The letter predicts a "50-50 chance" of an unfair labor practice charge being sustained. The price of refusing to engage in possibly illegal retaliation is high, according to GE. On page 5, the letter lists some of the possibilities - -

Disadvantages

- Retaliatory action by NR, e.g., refusal to continue funding for KAPL positions presently occupied by GE employees thus forcing a displacement of those people.

- The Admiral will involve higher echelons of GE management. (His approach is likely to be in a different mode and on a higher plane than that to which KAPL management is accustomed, e.g., he will talk in terms of national defense needs, etc.).

- The Admiral may "go public" in his criticism of GE as he has done with the shipyards. GE is trying to cover-up its own management failures, etc.

- The Admiral may withdraw Navy personnel from KSO thus adversely affecting the area's economy and bringing pressure on GE, i.e., GE compelled him to take that action.

- The Admiral may threaten to remove GE management from KSO and turn the Site over to Westinghouse.

- The Admiral will almost certainly withhold new project-type work from KAPL and MAO and give it to the Westinghouse counterparts, i.e., Bettis and PAD.

Mr. Vanselow's letter further states that SNR had not performed Davis-Bacon Act reviews of subcontracting protocol as it should have, possibly subjecting the contractor to liability.

Further, the contractor later apparently decided that retaliation against specific union activists was a desirable method of carrying out NR's directive. In a contractor document dated three months later, July 1978, and entitled, "Assessment of KAPL Fitter Reduction on Labor Relations Climate," (Attachment 5) J.M. Julian offers a plan that identified union activists in a layoff action. Out of a possible six employees targeted for layoff, the document states, three were responsible "for the bulk of KSO unrest." The document offers another alternative that would only target three employees, but include two "KSO Fitters representing major contributors to the unrest." Of course, that left one troublemaker to deal with, but, the document speculated, "having lost his associates, he could experience a favorable change in attitude." (Attachment 5, p. 3).

In short, these two pieces of correspondence illustrate the roots of a long term, active government-directed campaign to target union members who were perceived as too vocal or aggressive about safety issues for the government to tolerate. The general concerns expressed by Naval Reactors about union complaints about safety matters such as "ice falling off the Hortonsphere," and visits to Congressmen by union members were obviously translated into concrete action against specific individuals. Is it any wonder, then, that KAPL workers, especially union members, demand confidentiality in their statements? The correspondence indicates that the government, and Naval Reactors in particular, is the aggressor in employee retaliatory measures. In such an atmosphere, turning over statements of union members who supported a lawsuit against Naval Reactors can easily be seen as a new governmental effort at identifying those employees for retaliatory purposes.

On another note, Mr. Allen takes great exception to some of the statements in your letter of April 13, 1990, wherein you stated that: "[D]uring the five year period -- 1985 through 1989 -- you submitted three Health and Safety complaints to SNR." You further stated that "[e]ach complaint was handled as a serious matter and a thorough investigation was conducted by this office." Finally, you stated that, "[t[he investigations of two additional complaints received in March 1990, are nearing completion and, as in the past, SNR will provide results to you by letter." These statements are inaccurate or incomplete for the following reasons.

Initially, your letter of April 13, 1990 is misleading since it wrongly states that Mr. Allen issued only three health and safety complaints over a five year period. The fact is that he issued seven formal OSHA complaints between September 4, 1984 - March 29, 1990 and a total of thirty-eight (38) health and safety grievances to General Electric management during the period of June 18, 1982 - March 29, 1990, in addition to numerous, informal verbal complaints. The formal grievances to GE management are complaints that SNR was or should have been made aware of by GE management. Your letter of April 13, 1990 clearly states that "...SNR has the responsibility for health, safety and environmental matters at KAPL..." We assume that GE is informing your office of such complaints. It is unreasonable to expect Mr. Allen to contact your office separately about each and every safety matter that he brings to GE management's attention. His full time job precludes this as a practical matter.

I also note in responses to virtually all of his complaints - - whether to GE or SNR - - that the responses are usually in the form of non-responses, e.g. "there is no evidence...", "...there is no unsafe condition...", "...management will investigate further...". Responses such as these are clearly inappropriate particularly when related to asbestos concerns, discussed in more detail below. The asbestos situation should be addressed in something more than a perfunctory manner.

Apparently a decision has already been rendered relative to the union's complaint of March 29, 1990 which alleged that the entire KSO site population as well as the environment was exposed to asbestos particles which had been flaking and peeling from a cooling tower. The Saratogian newspaper (April 11, 1990) quoted Mr. Sabian as saying that no problems had been found related to that complaint. (Attachment 6). You state in your April 13, 1990 letter that an investigation of the incident has yet to be completed. This lack of candor further reduces worker confidence.

Your letter is also misleading in that it attempts to minimize the very real asbestos problems at the Kesselring Site Operations (KSO), at West Milton, and at the Knolls site in Niskayuna. Attachments 7 through 25 give a very graphic description of the problems encountered by Mr. Allen in obtaining any cooperation from SNR or GE relative to asbestos matters. It took two years from the time of his complaint of April 10, 1986 (Attachment 7) to obtain an asbestos abatement plan for KSO from GE (Attachments 13 and 14) and until January 6, 1989 to obtain an abatement plan for the Knolls Site (Attachment 21). I would furthermore not consider Attachment 21, a conclusory three-sentence statement which lacks appropriate details, to be an abatement plan in any meaningful sense. Attachments 14 through 18 hardly indicate "... localized asbestos concerns, not a widespread problem," as stated in your letter of November 29, 1988 (Attachment 20). Rather, Attachments 14 through 18 indicate a tangled asbestos mess for which, until the GAO investigation was announced, neither GE nor DOE management has given much more than lip service.

Attachments 14 through 18 certainly do not show a lack of "[e]vidence that employees were exposed to asbestos or any unsafe conditions," as stated in your letter of June 16, 1988. (Attachment 10) On the contrary, a request for approval of a course of action to alleviate the asbestos problems then plaguing KAPL, clearly acknowledges that 4,000 feet of pipeline covering needs repair since weather conditions had severely reduced its effectiveness. (Attachment 13) Furthermore, G. Terranova states that "[t]hese areas must be repaired to prevent a release of asbestos fibers."1 These documents also list over 120 repair locations and speculate that 1,892 man hours will be required to remedy all areas concerned.

Attachments 26 through 34, related to radiation concerns, although drawing conclusion similar to SNR's conclusions concerning asbestos, at least provide some semblance of a formal investigation. However, nowhere in Attachments 7 through 25, or in any other record, is there a similar investigation relative to asbestos issues.

The facts set forth in Attachments 14 through 18 are clearly at odds with your office's April 26, 1986 conclusions, rendered in response to an OSHA Safety Complaint (filed on April 10, 1986) which cited deteriorating asbestos pipe insulation in violation of C.F.R. 1910.1001 (Attachments 7 and 8). The response admits only a potential for unnecessary exposure and further asserts that "there is no evidence that the Federal Exposure Limit is being exceeded at the Kesselring site as a result of the exposed asbestos." Likewise, Attachments 19 and 21 portray management's affinity for denying facts - - in spite of their compelling specificity - - through terse, conclusory assertions. Attachment 20, a response to an OSHA complaint filed by the union on October 14, 1988 which concerned the still problematic asbestos lagging hazard, asserts that "there is no evidence that the Federal Exposure Limit is being exceeded," despite the fact that these events have occurred in violation of C.F.R. 1926.58 and all DOE Asbestos Directives issued to the General Electric Co., KAPL over the past ten years. However, management did acknowledge that "there is a need to stabilize the problem.

KAPL management has established an historical pattern of issuing untimely, conclusory responses to grievances filed by its employees and the union. These largely baseless responses routinely deny any violation of Occupational Safety & Health Standards or health and safety provisions found in their respective Articles of the IUE/GE National Contract. The documentation belies the KAPL myth, perpetuated by your letter, that management acts responsibly to correct egregious and potentially life-threatening concerns brought to light through union grievances. A few examples are provided below.

In 1981 employees voiced their safety concerns with respect to Cell #10. On May 6, 1981 an OSHA safety complaint was filed by the IUE Local. (Attachment 26). This grievance alleged loose surface contamination on top of the cell, unstable ductwork, and high radiation levels from some sections of the ductwork. A reading of 24,000 picocuries per 100/cm2 was well in excess of the allowable limits. KAPL management was aware of the situation. However, three months passed before SNR responded that "[t]here is no evidence that any KAPL employee has been exposed to an unsafe condition...[nor that] KAPL's radiological controls practices are inadequate for radiological work on top of R.M.L. cell #10."4 (Attachment 27) One could have just as easily said that there is no evidence that employees were not exposed to the high radiation levels on Cell 10 - - assuming it does not make it so. Prudent radiological practice mandates that conditions described in the union's grievance be rectified so as to eliminate the possibility of an exposure.