LETTER TO

THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DOE CLEANUP PROJECT ON SPRU VIOLATES NEPA

last update January 20, 2001

December 19, 2000

The Honorable Elliot Spitzer
Attorney General, State of New York
State Capital
Albany, NY 12224

References: [1] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended through 1982

[2] Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of Environment, Volume 24, Rev 7/1/99

Attachment:[1] Summary of SPRU Radiological Status Based on Mid-1980 Study

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is to notify your office of a serious violation of federal law by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program [NNPP] (also referred to as Naval Reactors) and the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]. The violation involves a failure to provide an Environmental Impact Statement [EIS] to appropriate federal, state, local officials, and agencies regarding a major federal action to dismantle and cleanup the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) located at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) in the Town of Niskayuna, New York. The National Environmental Policy Act, Reference 1, requires all agencies of the Federal Government to include in every major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action and (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented.

The Code of Federal Regulations, Reference 2, is quite clear in categorizing an environmental impact statement as a necessary and vital part of a process to be used by Federal officials to plan actions and make decisions, including the range of alternatives to be considered by the ultimate agency decision maker. The Code further indicates that environmental impact statements will be available before the program has reached a stage of investment or commitment to implementation, and that for projects directly undertaken by Federal agencies preparation will be at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later stage if necessary.

The DOE initiated the cleanup of SPRU during September 2000. Estimates are that it will require 14 years and $200 million to remove and cleanup radioactive contamination from this nuclear weapons factory pilot plant that separated plutonium from depleted reactor fuel so as to make atomic bombs. By both duration and cost, this cleanup project qualifies as a major Federal action as defined by the National Environmental Policy Act. The cleanup project also demands the utmost attention to environmental matters because of the large quantity of radioactive contamination present, because of the very high levels of much of this contamination, and because the proximity of Naval Reactor employees and the public to this facility. Contrary to recent statements by Naval Reactor representatives to the media that the amount of radioactivity involved in the cleanup is extremely small and that there is no risk of exposure to employees or the public, a 95 page 1980’s study presents findings markedly different from these recent claims. Attachment 1 presents a summary of the alarming details of the 1980’s study. This study included the following statement: "The potential for radioactive release is higher for complete demolition and removal of SPRU than for other courses of action during the active work phase." Since demolition and removal are the actions now being undertaken by the DOE cleanup project, this is precisely why an Environmental Impact Statement must be developed before the cleanup proceeds.

In recent years, following the end of the cold war, the DOE has embarked on major cleanup activities at many of its production weapons factories and their support facilities. Because of their nature, not one weapons factory has undergone cleanup before an Environmental Impact Statement has been developed. Invariably, and without exception, these cleanup attempts have encountered nightmarish difficulties that have defied current technology. As a result, the DOE has been devoting billions of dollars toward the development of new state-of-the-art cleanup techniques, but with little success. Additionally, two recent investigations by independent groups retained by the DOE have made important and relevant findings. The first investigation found that over the years both the DOE and its contractors have consistently understated the levels of radioactivity contamination present at its facilities by at least a factor-of-ten. The second investigation found that over 90% of the DOE facilities scheduled for cleanup can never reach a state that allows for unconditional release. These comments and findings apply to the SPRU facility.

At this time, it is not evident as to why the EIS requirement has been ignored. However, there is reason to believe that it was Naval Reactors who has improperly declared the Environmental Impact Statement for SPRU cleanup to be unnecessary, merely to expedite the transfer of jurisdiction to the DOE cleanup project. If this be the case, this deception has probably denied the DOE cleanup project valuable historic information, left the project without a clue as to what they are dealing with, and prevented their recognition that an Environmental Impact Statement is required. Most importantly, it leaves the employees at KAPL, the public, and the environment at high risk.

If Naval Reactors has, in fact, made the decision to proceed without an EIS, then this violates the Code of Federal Regulations (Reference 2) which clearly states that an EIS is the responsibility of the ultimate agency decision maker. Since the SPRU is now under the jurisdiction of the DOE cleanup project, it is they who are the ultimate decision maker as to what methods, procedures, and safety measures are to be implemented in the conduct of the cleanup. On the other hand, if the decision to proceed without an EIS was made by the DOE cleanup project, then the Department of Energy demonstrates a remarkable betrayal of trust and responsibility in providing rightful safety protections to the citizens of the Capital Region.

In summary, since the 1980’s study indicated a high potential for radioactive releases during demolition and since no other DOE weapons factory cleanup has ever been initiated without an EIS, state and local officials must be provided with an acceptable Environmental Impact Statement before any further work proceeds on SPRU. It just so happens to be the law of the land. We the undersigned respectfully request that your office initiate an immediate investigation into this matter.

John P. Shannon, physicist, nuclear engineer

Robert G. Stater, nuclear engineer, P.E.


ATTACHMENT #1

SUMMARY OF SPRU RADIOLOGICAL STATUS - BASED ON MID-1980 STUDY

In recent weeks, local newspapers have carried stories about the initiation of cleanup at the Knolls site Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU), a nuclear weapons factory used in 1950s. These articles are based on a considerable amount of misinformation put forth by Naval Reactors. But perhaps this is to be expected since the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) is apparently emerging from fifty years of operating behind a veil of secrecy. Still, their sudden invitation to site tours for the purpose of disseminating volunteered information, as well as their declared intent of now opening lines of communication with neighbors and the local community, seems somehow out of character.

Much information already exists about the SPRU facility from studies conducted after its shutdown in 1954. An early 1970’s study estimated the cost of removing all SPRU facilities at $14.6 million but recommended no action. A 95 page document presents results of a mid-1980’s study that concludes the facility should be completely dismantled and removed, at an estimated cost of $50.7 million. Little, if any, follow-up occurred after the study. However, the findings of the latter study differ markedly from the recently volunteered information.

Naval Reactors now states that SPRU was considered to be a very low priority because there is no exposure concern. However, the 1980’s study acknowledged several exposure concerns in recommending that, "the long-range plan for the SPRU complex should be complete removal because other alternatives evaluated present various degrees of health and safety risk to both KAPL employees and the public as long as the facility remains." The concerns, characterized as growing problems because of continued building deterioration, were: (1) General Electric employee concerns working in substandard facilities where radiological incidents have occurred, (2) Preventing the further spread of radioactive contamination (into occupied areas), and (3) Preventing radioactive contamination from escaping from the site. The study also revealed that a few employees had refused to be located in Building G-2 and that they had been accommodated. Thus, it is clear that serious concerns have been expressed for many years by both KAPL management and employees about "health and safety risks" from SPRU radioactive contamination.

The 1980’s study included the following appraisal: "There is a risk that personnel could become contaminated due to their immediate proximity to known contamination areas or unknown contamination areas and could possibly lead to legal action. Removal of all KAPL personnel from the facilities would reduce personnel risk relative to being involved with a radiological problem and possible adverse personnel reaction. The advantage of complete removal is that the SPRU facility can no longer have any potential negative impact on KAPL employees, the public, General Electric, or the Government. KAPL personnel will no longer occupy a radiologically substandard facility. It is important that no radioactive material be released to the environment. Such a release could create a serious concern and could cause an undesirable KAPL-employee relations problem and potential employee health hazard."

Additionally, Naval Reactors states that the amount of radioactivity they are concerning themselves with, in many cases, is lower than what would naturally occur in any soil. But, if it requires six years to complete the testing and cataloging of contaminates, including much that is highly radioactive, by what means does KAPL foresee such sub-minimal radiation levels? In any case, this claim is contradicted by 1989 soil samples taken along the bike path adjacent to KAPL’s Peek Street weapon’s factory that measured 700% greater than background radiation and contained plutonium, and samples from the weapons factory contamination in the KAPL parking lot that measured 1200% greater than background. Of course, the real problem of radioactively contaminated soil is that the radioactivity is transported far and wide by groundwater flow. The 1980’a study states that, "The Groundwater passing through the Knolls Site is flowing towards the Mohawk River. Local regions of the groundwater will flow towards ravines and low points during the movement, but all groundwater in the Knolls region is moving towards and will end up in the Mohawk River."

But, soil contamination is the least of the problems. The sealed SPRU cells and the tank storage farm contain the mother lode of all radioactivity to be removed. The fact that the five SPRU facility cells, whose concrete walls are five feet thick, have been under negative pressure for 50 years is not without good reason. These cells contain significant quantities on loose high level radioactive contaminants, including plutonium, cesium-137, and a mixture of fission products, that could otherwise leak to the surroundings. In addition many of the concrete walls of the SPRU complex are deeply impregnated with radioactive contamination. If the seal and negative pressure are required while the cells are dormant, what provisions is the DOE using to ensure that demolition does not eject massive quantities of radioactive contaminates and radioactive concrete dust into the atmosphere? KAPL itself now verifies that high levels of radioactivity are involved by identifying the destination for SPRU waste as YUCCA mountain, the yet to be completed U.S. "high level" waste repository in Nevada. Further, the 1980’s study indicates that the total volume of radioactive waste to be disposed of is approximately 283,000 cubic feet A most worrisome, and relevant, statement in the 1980’s study reads, "The potential for radioactive release is higher for complete demolition and removal of SPRU than for other courses of action during the active work phase." Demolition/removal are the actions being undertaken by the DOE.

The 1980’s study identifies occupied areas to be decontaminated and stabilized as the Crane gallery and adjacent office space, the Technical Library and Library storage area, the G-2 Ladies’ and Men’s Rooms, the Nondestructive Test and adjacent areas, the First and Second floor office areas, the Ventilation/filter room, the Upper and lower sample aisle, and the Pipe and motor generator room. The following are a sampling of the disturbing specifics:

As a result of the above problems, the 1980’s SPRU report made six recommendations aimed at "controlling the situation until SPRU is removed." The key recommendation, to move all personnel out of Building G-2 and out of Building H-2, never happened. In fact, as confirmed by KAPL in 1989, the majority of the recommendations of the 1980’s study were never implemented. Yet, the 1990-91 investigations by the General Accounting Office (GAO), and their published findings, give no hint of the alarming problems identified in the 1980’s SPRU study, nor of the failure by KAPL to take corrective action. The GAO report merely states that, "Some areas in the buildings have been decontaminated and are presently used as office space. Other areas are used for storing radioactive material, and some are sealed. The buildings are routinely monitored for radioactivity, and when any maintenance is required, special procedures are implemented to protect workers from radioactive materials." KAPL management now states that, "Right from the outset we knew the contamination was there". What they "knew right from the outset" is substantially more than that "the contamination was there." They knew, at minimum, what is documented in the 1980’s SPRU study, as outlined above.

Furthermore, under the guise of the SPRU cleanup, KAPL is now investigating radioactive contamination of a defunct railroad spur where radioactive material may have seeped from barrels, a parking lot that may have been built using contaminated fill, and a wooded patch over looking the Mohawk River where radioactive waste was stored in barrels from 1952 to 1954. The wooded patch is believed to contain cesium-137, strontium-90, and plutonium. The DOE cleanup project has made inquiries trying to ascertain the location of two-hundred 55 gallon drums containing radioactive sludge that are buried in the KAPL landfill. At the same time at least one major cleanup project has been underway at KAPL for more than three years to decontaminate the large two stories E-building complex of radioactivity and beryllium dust. All of these areas were part of the allegations presented to the GAO investigators and ignored in their final whitewash report.

And finally, KAPL now indicates that the federal government - not Lockheed Martin - is responsible for the cleanup and facility dismantlement. The 1980’s SPRU study states that:

"Prior to a major Federal action that might significantly affect the quality of the human environment, the National Environmental Policy Act of January 1, 1970 requires the preparation of a detailed statement on the environmental impact of the proposed action ¼ DOE Order 5440.1B requires each decommissioning project plan to include plans for compliance with the applicable provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act as implemented by DOE Order 5440.1B." and that, "Several decommissioning projects have been previously required to prepare environmental impact statements, including decommissioning of the Shippingport Reactor, disposal of defueled nuclear submarines, and decommissioning of the Space Radiation Effects Laboratory."

The existence, or lack thereof, of an Environmental Impact Statement is notable by its absence from the newfound KAPL "open line of communication." However, with the 1980’s study indicating a high potential for radioactive releases during demolition, the DOE is obligated to provide an Environmental Impact Statement and have it approved by an independent organization. Local officials must make certain that an acceptable Environmental Impact Statement exists before any further work proceeds on SPRU.


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