Return to Grady
On-LineI. The Background
In the 1896 case
of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that "separate but equal" facilities met the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state should deprive its citizens
of the "equal protection of the laws." At least eight
subsequent Supreme Court decisions and more than 70 lower federal
and state court cases followed that doctrine. In reliance on that
doctrine many billions of dollars have been spent to make the
separate schools for Negroes truly equal in all respects to those
provided for white children.
At one time or another, after the adoption of the amendment, 23
states maintained segregated schools by law, including New York,
Illinois, California, and Kansas among other non-southern states.
In 1954 with no change in the Constitution and no congressional
legislation, the Supreme Court held that separate schools, regardless
of the quality of their facilities, personnel and program, are
inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional. Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
We consider this decision utterly unsound on the facts; contrary to the clear intent of the Fourteenth Amendment; a usurpation of legislative function through judicial process; and an invasion of the reserved rights of states. We further consider that, putting aside the question of segregation, this decision represents a clear and present danger to our system of constitutional government, because it places what the court calls "modern authority" in sociology and psychology above the ancient authority of the law, and because it places the transitory views of the Supreme Court above the legislative power of Congress, the settled construction of the Constitution, and the reserved sovereignty of the several states.
Nevertheless, we must recognize that the decision exists: that it is binding on the lower federal courts; and that it will be enforced.
II. General
Assembly Committee on Schools
Because of a pending suit in a federal court to bring about the
integration of the races in the Atlanta school system, the General
Assembly of Georgia at its 1960 session expressed the belief "that
the people of Georgia may wish to make a deliberate determination
as to whether future education is to be afforded through direct
tuition payments for use in private schools devoid of governmental
control, or whether the public school system as it presently exists
shall be maintained notwithstanding that the school system of
Atlanta and even others yet to come may be integrated . . ."
In order that the General Assembly might be in a better position
to "make a determination as to the wisdom of presenting this
question to the people, "the Assembly felt that it should
have the advice and counsel of the people, not only as to the
desirability of the presentation, but also as to its form and
content."
As a means of
obtaining expressions of opinion from the people, the General
Assembly created the General Assembly Committee on Schools consisting
of nineteen members. This Committee was directed, immediately
upon the adjournment of the General Assembly, to conduct at least
one public hearing in each congressional district of the state.
The Committee was directed to make positive recommendations to
the General Assembly "regarding whether or not to submit
the question to the people of Georgia for their determination,"
and in the event the Committee should recommend the submission
of the question to the people, the Committee was asked to recommend
"the time, manner and form of the submission, including its
contents." The Committee was also directed to "make
such other and further recommendations as it may deem proper."
The Committee held the hearings as directed. It received testimony from more than 1,800 witnesses, representing or purporting to represent more than 115,000 people. Among these witnesses were more than 1,600 white persons and 200 Negroes. In addition the Committee has received over 600 letters from individuals and petitions bearing more than 6,000 signatures. A three to two majority of the witnesses favored maintaining segregation even at the cost of abolishing public schools. The hearings disclosed a nearly unanimous feeling on basic principles regarding segregation and public schools, but a wide difference of opinion on the course of that should be taken to meet the situation created by the federal court decision.
The testimony
cannot be accurately assessed as to the mathematical proportion
of the people of Georgia holding particular opinions, because
of the defects inherent in the only procedures that the committee
could adopt and because of the comparatively small number of the
people who could be heard. For example, 40 per cent of the counties
were represented by three or fewer witnesses. Nevertheless, the
committee has been able to reach these conclusions, based on the
testimony presented to it:
1. An overwhelming majority of people in Georgia have a deep conviction
that separate school facilities for the white and colored races
are in the best interest of both races, and that compulsory association
of the races in the schools through enforced integration will
be detrimental to the peace, good order and tranquility of the
state and to the progress, harmony and good relations between
the races. With this opinion your committee is in full agreement.
2. The vast majority of the people prefer tax-supported, segregated public schools rather than private schools with or without grants in aid from the state. It is their belief that it is in the public schools that the youth of the state receive training for the responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy; that to close the public schools and go to a system of private schools even with such grants in aid would make it more difficult for many young people to obtain an adequate education. The burden would be particularly heavy on those in the lower income brackets. With these views your committee is also in full accord.
3. Testimony received by the committee indicated that if total segregation cannot be maintained in a state-wide system of public schools, there is no unanimity of opinion as to the course that should be followed. Three points of view are expressed:
(a) A large number of people are willing to close the schools on a statewide basis, rather than allow any integration anywhere.
(b) A large number of people desire that the choice between closing the schools and accepting integration be left to the community affected. This viewpoint is predicated on two considerations: First, many people, believing that their own school systems will not be confronted with integration problems within the foreseeable future, are unwilling to sacrifice their schools to maintain segregation in other parts of the state; and second, a number of people feel that conditions are so varied throughout the state that the decisions on local problems should be left to local authorities.
(c) A large number of people though believing in the desirability of segregation, would be willing to accept some degree of integration rather than to sacrifice their public schools.
III. The Present Legal Situation
If a Negro child is ordered into a white Atlanta school, the governor is required, under 1955 and 1956 laws (Code 32-801, et seq.) to close all the schools in the Atlanta system. Expenditures of state or local funds to operate an integrated school system are prohibited and made a felony, and personal civil liability is imposed on those making such expenditures.
Other Georgia laws also prohibit the support of integrated schools by state or local tax funds. Among them are these:
The Georgia Constitution
requires that "Separate schools shall be provided for the
white and colored races" (Code 2-6401); the 1956 appropriation
act (Ga. Laws 1956, p. 753, 758) under which the state is still
operating, provides that funds are cut off for school districts
ordered desegregated; a 1955 act (Code 32-802) requires that budgets
submitted by local school districts to the State Board of Education
provide that the funds therein requisitioned will lapse in the
event of integration.
If any Atlanta school is closed, no other school district is necessarily
affected. However, when the same situation arose in Norfolk, Virginia,
parents of white children who had attended the closed schools
brought suit and a three-judge federal court held:
"Tested by
these principles we arrive at the inescapable conclusion that
the Commonwealth of Virginia, having accepted and assumed the
responsibility of maintaining and operating public schools, cannot
act through one of its Officers to close one or more public schools
in the state solely by reason of the assignment to, or enrollment
or presence in that public school of children of different races
or colors, and, at the same time, keep other public schools throughout
the state open on a segregated basis. The 'equal protection' afforded
to all citizens and taxpayers is lacking in such a situation.
While the State of Virginia, directly or indirectly, maintains
and operates a school system with the use of public funds, or
participates by arrangement or otherwise in the management of
such a school system, no one public school or grade in Virginia
may be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, while the state permits other public schools
or grades to remain open at the expense of the taxpayers."--James
v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331.
The decree based upon this decision ordered that the Norfolk schools
be reopened on an integrated basis, and enjoined the state officials
from continuing to operate other schools unless the Norfolk schools
were likewise open. The decree did not order or contemplate closing
all the schools of the state, and the state did not undertake
closing the statewide school system; instead it decided to accept
integration in Norfolk and subsequently in other areas.
It must be assumed that a similar suit would be filed by Atlanta parents, and that a similar holding would follow, although the committee cannot undertake to predict the form which the decree effectuating such a holding would take.
In any event, under such a holding the state would be faced with the necessity for deciding whether to close all the schools of the state, by legislation or otherwise, or to accept integration of the Atlanta schools.
IV. Freedom
of Choice
The Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, is controlling and binding upon the courts and the people;
and the state laws, insofar as they are in conflict with the federal
law, are unenforceable.
Any system of public education must now recognize that the Supreme Court decision in the Brown case destroyed the power of the state to compel by law separation of the races in public, tax-supported schools. Any continuance of public education must be adjusted to that fact.
It is important, therefore, to determine the scope and limitations of the Brown case as interpreted and applied by the federal courts. We quote from the decisions as follows:
"Desegregation does not mean that there must be intermingling of the races in all school districts. It means only that they may not be prevented from intermingling or going to school together because of race or color.
"If it is a fact, as we understand it is, with respect to Buchanan School, that the district is inhabited entirely by colored students, no violation of any constitutional right results because they are compelled to attend the school in the district in which they live."
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas, 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. C. Kan. 1955)
(This was a later decision in the Brown case, rendered after the case went back to the District Court for implementation.)
"... having
said this, it is important that we point out exactly what the
Supreme Court has decided and what it has not decided in this
case. It has not decided that the Federal Courts are to take over
or regulate the public schools of the states. It has not decided
that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools
or must require them to attend school or must deprive them of
the right of choosing the school they attend. What it has decided,
and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any
person on account of race the right to attend any school that
it maintains. This, under the decision of the Supreme Court, the
state may not do directly or indirectly; but if the schools in
which it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation
of the Constitution is involved even though the children of different
rates voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different
churches. Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the
Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the
schools they attend. The Constitution in other words, does not
require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does
not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary
action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the
exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation
upon the freedom of individuals."
Briggs V. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (D. C. S. C. 1955)
"The Constitution as construed in the School Segregation Cases; Brown v. Board of Education, forbids any state action requiring segregation of children in public schools solely on account of race; it does not however, require actual integration of the races." (Court then quoted from Briggs case, quoted herein above.)
Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School District, 241 F2d 230 (C. A. 5th 1957), cert. den. 353 U. S. 938.
"It must be remembered that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education do not compel the mixing of the different races in the public schools. No general reshuffling of the pupils in any school system has been commanded. The order of that court is simply that no child shall be denied admission to a school on the basis of race or color. Indeed, just so a child is not through any form of compulsion or pressure required to stay in a certain school, or denied transfer to another school, because of his race or color, the school heads may allow the pupil, whether white or Negro, to go to the same school as he would have attended in the absence of the ruling of the Supreme Court. Consequently, compliance with that ruling may well not necessitate such extensive changes in the school system as some anticipate."
Thompson v. School Board of Arlington, 144 F. Supp. 239
(D. C. Va. 1956), affirmed sub nom. School Board of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F2d 59 (C. A. 4th 1956), cert. den. 77 S. Ct. 667 (2 cases).
"...the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment do not affirmatively command integration, but they do forbid any state action requiring segregation on account of race or color of children in the public schools.
Avery v. Wichita Falls Indep. School District, 5 Cir, 1957, 241 F2d 230, 233.
Pupils may, of course, be separated according to their degree of advancement or retardation, their ability to learn, on account of their health, or for any other legitimate reason, but each child is entitled to be treated as an individual without regard to his race or color." Borders v. Rippy, 247 F2d 268 (C. A. 5th 1957).
In Plessy v Ferguson, which was good law for sixty-eight years until superceded by the Brown case, the Supreme Court very wisely recognized that compulsory association can only bring about the tensions and social disorder which have resulted from the 1954 decision:
"If the two
races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's
merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. As was said by
the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N.
Y, 438, 448: "This end can neither be accomplished nor promoted
by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community
upon whom they are designed to operate. When the government, therefore,
has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law,
and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished
the end for which it was organized, and performed all of the functions
respecting social advantages with which it is endowed." Legislation
is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can
only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.
If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane." Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Thus it is seen that while the state is without power to enforce
racial segregation in schools by law, the federal government under
the Constitution is without power to impose integration upon the
individual. As was pointed out by the Court in the Briggs case
above, "nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of
the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose
the schools they attend. The Constitution . . . does not require
integration." The state therefore may within the bounds of
the federal constitution establish a system of public education
that preserves and guarantees this freedom of choice to the individual--the
right of the individual to select his own associates.
This right is especially valuable during the impressionable and formative school age. The educational process is as much a social matter as an intellectual one, and the parent has the right and the duty to place his child in a school where an atmosphere of harmony and congeniality prevails and where the child can work with acceptable companions toward the attainment of their common educational goals. The parent has the responsibility to avoid the selection of a school with an atmosphere of compulsory and undesirable associations and where there exist the contentions and hostilities that so often result from the strife of judicial proceedings and court orders.
This right of free choice of one's associates is in violation of no law, state or federal, and is sanctioned by all enlightened people. It is the foundation stone of all society and is the base upon which progress, happiness, good order and good feeling among people are built.
The United States Supreme Court has very recently held that freedom of association is embraced within the First Amendment guarantees against governmental encroachment. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480, 485 (1960). The freedom to associate necessarily implies the freedom not to associate.
The question before the Committee is whether the people of Georgia should be permitted to say whether they desire to establish a system of' public schools within the framework of the federal court decisions, with such safeguards as will protect the right of free choice of both the parent of the child and of the local community, and that will guarantee that no child in Georgia will be compelled to go to a mixed school against the wishes of his parent or guardian.
When Georgia in
1954 amended its constitution so as to make possible tuition grants
from public funds to enable students to attend private schools,
the plan offered what then seemed to be an effective alternative
to mixed schools. These grants were to be in lieu of all other
educational responsibility of the state, and it was assumed that
schools could be closed on a system-by-system basis as they became
subject to federal court decrees, and that tuition grants would
be made available to each such system only upon the event of its
closing. It was not contemplated that a situation would come about
wherein the state could legally close its schools only on a statewide
basis. That situation has developed because of later decisions
by the federal courts. The Amendment, however, in permitting grants
in aid, was a farsighted act of statesmanship and, regardless
of the turn of events, can be of great help in working out a solution
of the present problem.
V. Conclusions
The conclusion is inescapable that; to maintain total segregation
everywhere in the state, the state will almost certainly have
to withdraw from the operation of public schools. Presumably,
under the 1954 amendment to the Georgia Constitution (Code 2-7502),
the state could give grants or scholarships to individual school
children for use in such private schools as may exist or may be
established. The state could have nothing to do with the organization,
operation, or supervision of such private schools. "State
support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management,
funds or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command
that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958).
Leasing publicly owned facilities to private operators to avoid
integration has been held invalid. Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F. 2d
97 (C.A. 8th 1958), and cases cited at page 108. Hence, existing
public school buildings, buses, books and the like could not be
used except after a bona fide purchase by private schools at fair
market value.
There are many other serious and difficult problems involved in the establishment and operation of private schools. Among them is the provision of adequate funds for the many phases of school operations. Building must be financed, transportation facilities must be secured, adequate funds for operation must be found. The problems of accreditation for the private schools will demand serious study. The costs per student are likely to be so high that many students will be unable to attend because any possible tuition grants will be inadequate to cover the costs. And perhaps most serious of all is the fact that a democratic state will lose all control over the institutions in which the minds, character and ideals of the future citizens of the state are molded.
It is our conclusion
that, although there are some localities where such private schools
could be maintained successfully, it will be impractical to develop
a system of private schools that will provide adequately for the
educational needs of the masses of the people of the state.
Furthermore, even if a system of private schools is adopted, the
state, having no control of such schools would be powerless to
prohibit integration in them if some private schools voluntarily
integrated. Those who want to mix voluntarily can mix under the
law and the state is powerless to prevent it.
The basic alternative to closing the public schools and turning to private schools or accepting integration by court order appears to be a system giving authority to local boards to assign students to particular schools in accordance with the best interests of all students; and the giving of as much freedom of choice as possible to parents and local communities in the handling of their problems; and the giving of assurance that no child will be required to go to school with a child of a different race except on a voluntary basis.
Under a pupil placement plan, the board of each school district, or the governing authority of a school administrative unit, in making assignments of students to particular schools, may properly consider the place of residence of the student, his level of intelligence, his educational attainments, his home environment, his physical condition, and any other facts and circumstances that may bear on the question of the student's ability and fitness to do successful work in a particular school and to maintain satisfactory relationships with those with whom he will be associated, but without reference to race or color.
As stated by Judge Hooper in the Atlanta case:
"Essentially the Plan contemplates that all pupils in the school shall, until and unless transferred to some other school, remain where they are; all new and beginning students being assigned by the Superintendent or his authority, to a school selected by observance of certain standards as set forth in the Proposed Plan."
Later Judge Hooper states:
"A general review of the measures taken in many southern states and border states since the rendition of the Brown decision, "both by way of legislative enactments and by way of plans adopted without legislative action show that the so-called Pupil Placement Plan (also referred to as Pupil Assignment Plans, Enrollment Plans, etc.) have been adopted in one form or another in many states, including Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, and Tennessee. In some of these states the plans were adopted soon after the Brown decision, although there was at the time of the adoption of the same no litigation pending nor any action being taken toward the elimination of racial discrimination. The plans were no doubt adopted against the day when such efforts would be made and they were adopted in full recognition of the fact that the people of the states adopting them had no desire to abolish segregation, but considered it wise to make plans for the future against the day when segregation in such states might be enjoined by the courts. Mississippi was one of the first states to adopt such legislation, though as yet there have been no efforts to abolish segregation in that state."
Similar plans have been held valid by the federal courts. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Parham v. Dove, 271 F 2d 132 (C.A. 8th 1959); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F 2d 780 (C.A. 4th 1959).
A provision permitting each school district confronted with an unsatisfactory situation, to determine for itself whether to close its schools, would give each community the maximum freedom of choice. It is assumed that such a Provision would also allow subsequent action by the school district to alter the original decision; that is the community could decide from time to time whether it wished to reopen closed schools or to close integrated ones. The validity of such a provision has not been tested in the courts but in the light of many analogous situations it should be upheld. Such provisions are in effect in other states.
The evidence shows that public school problems throughout the state are infinitely varied. A plan giving to each local community the right to determine its own course of action on problems of a peculiarly local nature appears to offer the best and most democratic procedure for solving these peculiarly local problems.
A provision permitting each parent to withdraw his child from an integrated school and to have the child assigned to a nonintegrated school, if one is available, or else given a tuition grant for private schooling appears to provide the maximum freedom of choice to each parent. The right of a parent to choose between public and private schools has never been questioned; in fact, such a right has been expressly upheld by the Supreme Court. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, (1925). It is difficult to see how a plan of tuition grants, available to all parents who desire private education for their children could be challenged successfully.
If the schools are to be closed, the step should be taken as a deliberate choice, with the expectation that the state will go out of the school business permanently, except for providing tuition grants or scholarships and that the people will resort to private schools. Closing the schools otherwise is a useless gesture and can cause nothing but confusion, great economic loss, and utter chaos in the administration of the school system.
It should also be borne in mind that whatever the final decision may be as to the course of action to be followed, there will be far greater mobility and flexibility in the handling of local school situations, if the choice of the course of action can be made freely at the local level rather than under the compulsion of a court order. It has been abundantly demonstrated in other jurisdictions that the federal courts do not hesitate to strike down, as attempts to circumvent their orders, statutes or practices which might have been approved as valid if taken voluntarily.
Those who insist upon total segregation must face the fact that it cannot be maintained in public schools by state law. If they insist upon total segregation everywhere in the state they must be prepared to accept eventual abandonment of public education.
Those who insist
upon total segregation, but who back away from closing the schools,
are not only deceiving themselves and the people, but are creating
a very difficult and harmful situation: if the State stands upon
the present laws, yet declines to accept the ultimate closing
of the schools, the result will be integration in its worst form:
coercive integration by court order, with no safeguards available
to the local people and no freedom of action on the part of the
parents of children affected.
The alternative is to establish a system of education within the
limitations of the Supreme Court decision, yet one which will
secure the maximum segregation possible within the law, which
will vest the control of its schools in the people of the community,
and which will ensure the parent the greatest freedom in protecting
the welfare of his child.
To put this alternative into effect, the Committee believes that some changes are necessary in the Georgia Constitution. The guaranty that no child should be required to attend school with a child of another race ought to be one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. The provision for local control of schools probably requires Constitutional authority vested in the General Assembly. There is no authority in law for a purely advisory referendum, and under a representative form of government. Any such referendum could not properly be made binding on the General Assembly.
Since any Constitutional amendment requires ratification by a vote of the people in a general election, this would provide the opportunity for the people to determine for themselves the course which they desire to take. The complex details of the necessary statutes are a responsibility of the General Assembly and could be developed practicably only through the legislative process.
VI. The Recommendation
The Committee
recognizes, as has been heretofore stated, the people of Georgia,
though overwhelmingly in favor of both segregation and public
schools, are widely divided as to the best means of meeting the
situation that confronts them; that the question profoundly affects
every phase of the future life and activities of the people of
the state; that the question should be considered in an atmosphere
of calmness and far-sighted wisdom; that the question should be
decided only after the most careful deliberation and the most
thoughtful consideration of all the issues involved; and that
the public school system is of such transcendent importance that
its fate ought to be decided by a direct vote of the people. The
people of Georgia have never been called upon to make a more important
decision.
The Committee further recognizes that the primary concern of each
Georgia citizen is the welfare of his own children and that regardless
of the fate of the public schools, each parent should be protected
by the Georgia constitution from being forced to allow his child
to attend a school under what the parent considers intolerable
circumstances.
The Committee further recognizes that the situation before it is one subject to unforeseen future developments and that the Legislature should have the maximum latitude in meeting such developments, including certain constitutional powers which it does not now possess.
We Therefore Recommend:
1. That the General Assembly propose to the people of Georgia an amendment to the Constitution, reading substantially as follows:
"Notwithstanding
any other provision in this Constitution, no child of this state
shall be compelled against the will of his or her parent or guardian,
to attend the public schools with a child of the opposite race;
that any child whose parent or guardian objects to his attending
an integrated school, shall be entitled to reassignment, if practicable,
to another public school, or shall be entitled to a direct tuition
grant or scholarship aid, as provided by this Constitution and
as may be authorized by the General Assembly."
2. That the General Assembly propose to the people of Georgia
a further amendment to the Constitution substantially as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the General Assembly may provide for a uniform system of local units for the administration of the schools and authorize any such local administration unit, as defined by the General Assembly, to close schools within the unit or to reopen the schools in accordance with the wishes of a majority of the qualified voters of the unit as expressed in a formal election called for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the voters."
3. That the General
Assembly forthwith enact legislation providing for tuition grants
or scholarships for the benefit of any child whose parent chooses
to withdraw said child from an integrated school and for the benefit
of any child whose school has been closed, whether as a result
of existing or future Georgia laws or as a result of a court order.
4. That the General Assembly forthwith enact legislation making
the existing teacher retirement system available to teachers in
private schools in the same manner and on the same basis as it
now extends to teachers in public schools.
5. That the General
Assembly consider, whether, in view of the urgency created by
the Atlanta case and other cases which may be brought, it will
propose to close the public schools in order to maintain total
segregation throughout the state or whether it will choose a course
designed to keep the schools open with as much freedom of choice
to each parent and community as possible; and, if it chooses the
latter course, that it enact legislation enabling each school
board or other local body to establish a pupil assignment plan;
empowering the people of each community to vote whether to close
their schools in the event of integration or to continue the operation
of said schools, and enabling each parent to withdraw his child
from an integrated school and have the child reassigned to a segregated
school or receive a tuition grant or scholarship for private education.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON SCHOOLS
JOHN A. SIBLEY, Chairman
HOWELL HOLLIS, General Counsel
JOHN W. GREER, Secretary
ROBERT O. ARNOLD
SAMUEL J. BOYKIN
HARMON W. CALDWELL
CHARLES A. COWAN
JOHN W. DENT
ZADE KENIMER
DR. CLAUDE PURCELL
HOMER RANKIN
source: Atlanta Journal, April 29, 1960
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