Preface: W*r is Not a Four Letter Word



Unit 0 (Control), Atu 0 (The Fool), Directress, SubGenius Police, Usenet Tactical Unit (Mobile)

Official FAQ Promulgator, alt.binaries.slack

Defender of the Faithless in these Latter Daze of the CONdom


"Without preparedness superiority is not real superiority, and there can be no initiative either.

Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack."

-- Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War", (May, 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp 165-166.


Since the dawn of biped hominid evolution, the struggle for dominance has assumed a disproportionate share of the energies of both Yetinsyny and

hyoomins during their evanescent existences. From the first neonatal attempt to wrest the attentions of parents away from the television, to the final

dottering insistence on needless capital gains tax cuts, each of us continually grasps at every means at our disposal to get our own fucking way, NOW,

dammit, NOW! Thus, as our individual central nervous systems wrap themselves around our primal, selfish needs for food, clothing, shelter, orgasms, and

internet connectivity, we polish ever more sophisticated stratagems to wrap the phenomenological universe around our pinkie fingers. Inevitably,

however, our roaming bags of programmed genes and acculturated neurons run into each other, thus breeding either cooperation (the exception), or

conflict (the rule). As no two organisms share exactly the same nature and nurture; and as our survival and prosperity depend on exploitation of such

natural resources as air, water, and bandwidth; we recognize that CONFLICT is, as with suffering, taxes, and BLINKING HTML, one of the inescapable

cornerstones of our incarnated presence on this mudball.


How, then, does this well-accepted truth regarding the immanence of conflict break down when netizens begin to talk of W*r? First off, the W-word has

accreted on itself layer upon layer of negative connotation, both for us civilians who watch the nightly carnage known as news, and for military

members, who are fated to fulfill their modern duties under the harsh glare of CNN camera lights. W*r seems to most netizens to be an ugly, abnormal

state; a condition of failed intellect and creativity; and a nasty and brutish affair best avoided altogether, in the interest of maximizing pleasant,

poppy-perfumed peace. We at S.P.(U.T.U.)M. Central do not share this pollyanna-ish outlook. W*r is, in fact, as Carl von Clausewitz stated, the

continuation of politics by other means; moreover, as that other military genius, Mao Tse-Tung, so pithily noted, political power grows out of the barrel

of a gun.


A pause. No, we are not talking about *literal* physical guns that can hurt, maim, and kill innocent and guilty alike-- we are, in fact, talking about

THINKING ABOUT the Internet *as if* each UCE spam sent out were a bullet, *as if* each Usenet flood were an artillery barrage, and *as if* each

takedown of a friendly server were actually a KIA. That is, in other words, and to wit: in order to obtain a firm intellectual grasp of the nature of conflict

on the internet, it is INSTRUCTIVE to conceptualize the subject in the more gritty, bloody, and utilitarian terms used in the millennia-old study of the Art

of War. In no way to we wish to be seen as glorifying conflict and war; just as wars inevitably cause casualties, so do internet conflicts inevitably

engender TOS reprimands, account loss, and, eventually, 3-space legal altercations (or worse). It is PRECISELY because war is so devastating to all

who sip from its skull-shaped chalice that we must be very, very, very good at it. For, as the Romans said: Si vis pacem, para bellum-- if you desire

peace, prepare for war. Just as the first pilots of World War I flew their Fokker triplanes at their foes blindly, without any codified doctrine to guide them,

so have we, since 1996, fought the good fight against the nefarious forces of Spam by the seats of our virtual pants. We hope that this nascent manual

provides a brief primer on the art of War as applied to the new operational medium of the Net, so that future generations of Net.Warriors are not forced to

learn by error and trial what we have learned at such great cost in sweat, pride, and treasure.





Net.War Planning: The End is the Beginning


In order to assess how to conduct war against an opponent, one must first firmly visualize the peace you want after the din of fighting has ceased. Our

goal in all conflicts is always to win, and win BIG. However, our definition of WINNING BIG will determine, not only our behavior during periods of

relatively minor conflict (a.k.a. peace), but our responses to perceived hostile intentions by our adversaries (pre-hostilities behavior), our strategy and

tactics during actual conflict, and our approach to conflict resolution at the termination of active altercation. In other words, the end state must be

placed at the beginning of one's plans, else all efforts during the pre-hostilities, hostilities, and war termination phases will be as disjointed as the

Scarecrow in the Wizard of Oz-- who, of course, sorely lacked a brain.


What sort of peace do we envision at the end of a net.war? In general, we all want at least the status quo ante-- the situation before the

spammer/hacker/mailbomber affected our net.lives. But is that all we want? Depending on the nature and extent of damage inflicted by our opponent's

offensive incursion into our lives, we may wish to see him or her:


publicly identified, up to and including home phone number and favorite sex toy

humiliated, especially when done publicly so as to serve as an example (deterrent) to


kicked off of his or her internet access

drawn, quartered, hanged, sliced, diced and julienne fried.


But, is this really necessary to achieve our desired end state? Remember, give a man a TOS, and he will not spam for a day; teach a man why he was

TOSsed, and he may not spam for a lifetime. It is also true that the most dangerous opponent is one who is cornered, trapped, hopeless; as Sun Tzu said

"To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape; do not press an enemy at bay"-- else you will face an embittered and implacable enemy who

fights for his very survival. Thus, in the context of net.war, where invasion and permanent occupation of an enemy's computer systems is unlikely even

in the most favorable scenario, the best we can usually hope for is to guide the enemy to follow our will in such a PERSUASIVE and DECISIVE manner

that, not only will she no longer present a threat, her very takedown will serve as the proverbial spiked heads on the walls of the Tower of London. This

is one of the prime benefits, as we shall discuss later, in archiving the ephemeral threads of Usenet to the far more static medium of the Web: the

Spammer remains trapped like a bug in amber, so long as the benefit of rubbing his nose in his Spam outweighs the political/PR danger of appearing to

be overweeningly vindictive.


Thus we must bow to the logic of the medium, and admit that almost all Net.wars will end with your foe(s) very much alive, and able physically to return

to the field of combat another day (as the indefatigably stupid spammer Mike Enlow has recently done [July, 1997]). While wars of extirpation appeal to

our caffeine-jangled senses, we must take that deep breath and recognize that the vast preponderance of serious Net.Wars will end with:


a formal negotiated net.settlement (which we thought we had with Mike Enlow in March, 1997)

the spammer slinking off into his lair to lick his/her wounds in silence

a brief communiqué from his/her ISP regarding unspecified actions taken

a communiqué from his/her ISP stating that the spammer has been terminated

BEST CASE SCENARIO: A complete reformation in attitude, resulting in a new ally in the war on Spam (as in the example of Bill Mattocks, and,

hopefully, Mike Enlow).


Notice that 3-space legal action is not listed-- as of July, 1997, we know of no actual court case filed by a Spammer against anti-spam activists. This

does not mean that such a tactic would be impossible, or even difficult, to implement. Rather, most spammers recognize at some visceral level that their

techniques would be considered BAD THINGS by even the most free-speech activist jurist. Let's face it: even Supreme Court justices get junk UCE



Thus, given the high probability of some negotiated settlement, why embark at all on a defensive Net.War campaign?


It is the right thing to do-- without us, the Spammers would have destroyed the Net long ago

It enables us to negotiate from positions of strength-- with an ISP's TOS edict in your ink-stained pocket protector, even the most intransigent

spammer can suddenly find a modus vivendi.

It encourages troops and allies to continue fighting the good fight-- no one wants to support a wimp who negotiates at the first sign of defiance from


It enables one to gain maximum intel regarding the actual capabilities of your opponent, while testing your own OPSEC, COMSEC, and doctrinal tenets.


Speaking of doctrine, now is as good a time as any to further our analogy between Net.War planning and 3-space war planning by reviewing the steps

of Crisis Action Planning (as described in U.S. Joint Publication 5-03.1, JOPES Vol. I). 3-space war planning involves two distinct modes: Deliberate

Planning, in which detailed plans are drawn up way in advance regarding how to respond to contingencies; and Crisis Action Planning, which involves

rapid analysis of real-time emergencies and rational responses thereto. Let's face it: few of us have time to prepare detailed deliberate plans re how to

respond to specific Net.War scenarios (U.S. military takes 18-24 months for full DP cycle using the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System

[JOPES]) -- thus, almost all of us Net.Warriors will have to rely on Crisis Action Planning. The Six Steps of Crisis Action planning are:


Situation Development-- reported to higher HQ by Commander (CINC) of friendly forces in AOR (area of responsibility) by way of formal report or

verbal warning

Crisis Assessment-- by National Command Authority (NCA) and ministers of defence/general staff

Course of Action (COA) Development-- by ministers of defence/general staff, with input from CINCs

COA Selection-- by National Command Authority, minister of defence-- alert order published

Execution Planning-- by CINCs-- publishes operation order

Execution-- signalled by NCA as Execute order, carried out by CINCs


To translate this into Net.War terms, then, we have:


Situation Development-- e-mail/posts from users regarding spam/mailbomb/etc. incident

Crisis Assessment-- by net.gurus (C/TINC, SPUTUM, CAUCE members, etc.)

COA Development-- preferably CO-ORDINATED (too often we plan alone)

COA Selection-- given our loose organizations, perhaps best choice would be to present set of desirable COAs (via secure channels! Not via

Usenet post-- telegraphing punches is a no-no) and allow individuals to pick those they are comfortable with (avoids appearance of dictating

behavior among anti-Spammers)

Execution Planning-- by individual Anti-Spammers, based on their available time/resources/anger

Execution-- by individuals, with individual (not collective) responsibility for actions


To summarize, the war we fight will be determined by the end state we require. In order to gain our desired end state, we must firmly visualize the totality

of the landscape we wish to gaze upon from that distant hill of the future once we have terminated our war efforts. This visualization is not a light matter;

you will not find the picture wrapped around your next piece of Bazooka bubble gum. Instead, we must first turn our attention to the reality of the

Spammer as, not only a unitary eidolon of evil, but rather a very mortal system-- a system with vulnerabilities we may exploit to our advantage and to

her ruin.



Strategic Net.War Analysis: The Spammer as a System


"The Way of strategy is straight and true. You must chase the enemy around and make him obey your spirit."

--Shinmen Musashi No Kami Fujiwara no Genshin, a.k.a. Miyamoto Musashi, Go Rin no Sho: A Book of Five Rings, The Wind Book


Without boring the reader with hundreds of pages of historical examples, suffice it to say that many of the "Greatest Generals" of history were known

primarily for their leadership, charisma, and TACTICAL ability, rather than for their strategic wisdom. Only rarely, as in the case of Napoleon or

Guderian, does a general's ability extend beyond the leadership of troops, to what von Clausewitz termed the "Genius for War". Such a genius

recognizes that, in the modern age, we are no longer constrained by the logistic and geographical boundaries and limitations of our foremothers. In fact,

we can and MUST engage the enemy as a strategic system, composed of multiple inter-related and co-dependent systems, in order to effect our goal:

to turn the enemy to our will, and thus create the end-state which we have previously envisioned.


How do we accomplish this? First, we must identify the enemy system. In 3-space war, this is usually quite easy-- the enemy is that country which is

currently shooting at your guys. Unfortunately, in Net.War, pseudonymity and anonymity together are at least as common as not. Thus, as our

S.P.(U.T.U.)M. Tools web page ( points out, much of the tedious, day-to-day work of the Net.Warrior

revolves around peeling off masks to reveal the identity of one's opponent. This process takes months to learn well, but should be encouraged as a field

of study for all newcomers to the net.


Strategic Analysis from the Net.Warrior's point of view involves the study of networks, servers, IP addresses, and hosting relationships; however, to

make the subject more accessible, we shall begin by using the standard terminology for national strategic analysis. Only when we have attained a

certain familiarity with the concepts will we turn our attention to Net.War Strategy per se.


A nation as a system can be conceived of as having five essential components, which may be envisioned as nested spheres or concentric circles

(Warden's Five Ring Model). From the outside to the inside we proceed from most protected to least; we also proceed from most expendable to least. On

the outside sphere, we are faced with the nation's fielded forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Special Forces, etc.). These are the "crunchy

coating" surrounding the gooey center of the nation-- a true Genius (or, dare we say, SubGenius) will bypass this layer altogether. The next layer is

the population: the hyoomin resources upon whom the leader depends for war materiel production, adulation, and soldier production.


The population, although considered to be a legitimate target of warfare since the Napleonic era, is a really bad target to concentrate ones forces upon,

for three reasons: 1) they are many 2) they are generally dispersed, and 3) killing them will piss off, not only them, but your own people and allies. After

the population, we find the infrastructure layer. 3-space war defines this as the man-made part of the enemy's system which enables him to sustain the

war effort-- bridges, roads, communication networks, and electrical power stations come to mind. Next, we find system essentials (formerly known as

organic essentials): food, water, coal, oil, steel for munitions, etc. Finally, on the fifth and final sphere, we scry the face of the Leader Herself. In

actuality, the Leader may be a triumvirate, or, as in the case of the United States, a National Command Authority with redundant, written guidelines for

power transfer in case of death or incapacitation of the President. In any case, this inner sphere is the Motive Actor behind all resistance the enemy

has to offer-- bend or break Her, and the remaining fielded forces, infrastructure, and population will cease to offer any significant resistance.


Another way to conceptualize the enemy as a system vulnerable to strategic attack and paralysis is to identify in your enemy's system the seven

National Elements of Value (Barlow) which, when neutralized, will assure you the dominance you seek to bend your enemy to your will. The seven

NEV's include the enemy's:




Armed Forces






Massive parallel attack on all 7 NEV's provide the optimum chance to induce Strategic Paralysis and the rapid conclusion of hostilities on terms

advantageous to the attacker, provided the following four assumptions hold true:


1) Your choice of NEVs is accurate. NEVs vary from country to country, and from governmental system to governmental system. Scorched earth tactics

that would have extirpated Belgium enabled retreating Soviet Russian forces to deny critical infrastructure and organic essentials to the Nazi Germans

during Operation Barbarossa, thus buying the Soviets time in exchange for land and food.


2) Your enemy's NEVs will not be able to compensate for your attack. NEVs are designed to be self-compensating-- loss of population to

indiscriminate air attacks may strengthen the resolve of the leader and foster increased support from allies, to give but one example.


3) Your enemy is rational. Remember that "rationality" is an ethnocentric value judgment, which is highly dependent upon one's own sociocultural mores

and ethical Weltanschauung. For example, societies in which the promise of the afterlife induces religious fervor to the point of suicide bombing will not

be easily dissuaded from conflicts by massive casualty infliction alone. This is one of the prime reasons the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s dragged on for so

long-- Iran was willing to let its 15 year old boys march out onto mine fields to become martyrs for Allah, while Iraq was ruled by, you guessed it,

Saddam Hussein.


4) The necessary intelligence to carry out the strategic campaign is available. Let's face it, in the old days, figuring out who to fight was a no-brainer--

sometimes literally! You chopped up that dude in front of you who was trying to chop you up. Case closed. In the 21st century, it will no longer be

sufficient to identify, for instance, the one building housing the Iraqi Air Defense Command, as was done in the opening minutes of Desert Storm--

intelligence will be required to provide the exact ROOM in which the enemy command leadership is holed up, in order to minimize collateral damage and

to maximize the strategic military and political effect of precision guided munitions. Remember: in the 21st century, all weapons will be strategic.


As we enter the final stage of Strategic Analysis, we turn our attention to the four instruments of Strategic Power the Enemy may use against us: the

troika of Political, Military, and Economic power; plus Information, the "super glue" that binds and facilitates the other three. A detailed discussion of the

adumbrations of the meatspace Instruments of Power (IOP) is beyond the scope of this essay; however, it is instructive to think of the Fifth Element

which rules the others with an iron hand: Time. In time, Political affiliations weaken and decay, Military hardware rusts, Economic assets get frittered

away like last year's Arts budget, and Information which was zero-day cool becomes literally yesterday's news. Moreover, the four IOPs, ever active in

all hominid interactions, rise and fall in emphasis with the progression in Time from pre-hostilities, to war, to post-hostilities. For example, we usually

walk around the park relying upon our political power (as citizens) and our information (that this is a safe park) to ward off harm, while our military and

economic powers remain hidden. When that mugger over THERE jumps us, we may suddenly escalate our use of military power as we parry his knife

thrust and deliver a yok sudo to his windpipe, all the while screaming FIRE (a maskirovka {camouflage deception} -- see below) to gain the attention of

passers-by (information warfare); our political/diplomatic and economic powers take a back burner. OR, if the mugger threatens us with overwhelming

force majeur (a gun), we may elect to call upon our diplomacy (Don't shoot! I'm giving you what you want) and our economic power (the spare $20.00

we all should carry in our wallets for just such an emergency), all the while studying his face and clothing for later description (information dominance)

while jettisoning our military option as infeasible. When the mugging is over, we either call upon our economic and political power to sue him for

damages, or we rely upon our information to provide the police with relevant data in order that he may be apprehended by those empowered to utilize

deadly force (military power).


After defining our enemy's identity, her 5 Spheres, 7 elements of value, 4 instruments of power, and timing, we must remind ourselves that no dirtbag is

an island, entire to himself. In fact, without strict attention to the external linkages and alliances (the 7th NEV) which support him, all of our wizardly

efforts may be squandered. For example, in WWI, the German invasion of Belgium in accordance with the von Schlieffen plan had unintended

consequences, precisely because of that small, militarily-insignificant country's external political linkages to Great Britain. As would occur 25 years

later in the case of Poland, Great Britain was drawn into the Continental War by her mutual aid treaty with a small country invaded by Germany. The

Strategic advantage gained by Germany in both cases was more than offset by the early mobilization of Britannia.


How, then, do we apply this strategic analysis concept to our enemy du jour: the Spammer?


First, we must translate the Five Spheres (or Rings) of the enemy system into modern Net.War counterparts:


Sphere 5: Fielded forces-- throwaway AOL accounts, hired consultants, dedicated spam domains

Sphere 4: Population-- Spam-related customers, support employees (secretaries, etc.)

Sphere 3: Infrastructure-- Primary non-rogue ISPs, Websites, ftp sites, cgi scripts, mail relays, reputation

Sphere 2: System Essentials-- Money, bandwidth, telco access, computers

Sphere 1: Leadership-- the SpamBoy himself, his partners and business associates


By alliances, we mean those reciprocal relationships the spammer has formed with:


news media (Cyber-Clueless First Amendment activist newbie journalists, for example)

other spammers

ISPs, whether rogue or non-rogue

hacker consultants

fringe associates (Meowers, Kook Cabal)

banks, business organizations, and other sources of economic power



We must then examine our assumptions. If our Spammer runs his own ISP, then attacking an AOL account he controls (by complaining to will be of negative value-- a waste of our time and resources. If his ancillary server is somehow "taken down", but his primary

SpamServers keep pumping out ECP spam via open NNTP ports worldwide, what will we have gained? If he is (like Gr*bor or our own deeply

psychologically troubled Doktor Funway) only marginally rational, abuse and punishment that would persuade a reasonable Yeti to leave the field of

battle may only enrage the Bull(shitter) like the pricking of a picador. Finally, if we do not have the necessary intelligence to pinpoint our enemy and her

crucial Strategic systems exactly, our efforts will either be wasted entirely, or increased by orders of magnitude over what they could have been with

accurate and timely information.


In our final strategic translation matrix, we shall endeavor to identify what we mean by a Spammer's Political, Economic and Military powers; as well as

the proper role of the semi-tautological Net.War attribute of Information.


Political power: news media (online and traditional), lawmakers, friends and acquaintances, usenet Kooks

Economic power: cold hard cash earned both legitimately and by Spam; frivolous lawsuits (to tie up opponents' assets/time)

Military power: Net.war capabilities of spammer's own systems (mail bombs, Usenet binary bombs); hired gun hackers; open NNTP and mail

servers ripe for exploitation

Information: Positive and Negative--> Positive: Spammer's ability to gather intel on foes; ability to adapt to changing laws, standards, and

software affecting/enabling internet communication; ability to slander and defame enemies and thus provoke them to rash deeds;

Negative: the ability to cloak himself in anonymity, pseudonymity, and false faux-open identities, thus denying his enemies that first prerequisite

of strategic analysis: identification.


Once we have characterized the Strategic nature of our opponent, it is time to move toward Center of Gravity analysis, in order to identify exactly

which subsystems to target in our operational phase of hostilities.





Operational Net.War Analysis: Center of Gravity Analysis


"Therefore once more: War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of war, in its great

features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword instead of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws."


--Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege: On War, Book 5, Chapter VI


What is a center of gravity (COG)? Clausewitz, who coined the term insofar as it relates to warfare, defined it as: "the hub of all power and movement,

upon which everything depends." As warfare has evolved since Napoleonic times, other theorists, such as Jomini, Liddell-Hart, and Douhet have

refined the concept to include the multiple COGs inherent within the complex systems of modern nation-states. As a recent example, U.S. Army Field

Manual 100-5 states that a center of gravity is: "that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical

strength, or will to fight...As with any complex organism, some components are more vital than others to the smooth and reliable operation of the whole.

If these are damaged or destroyed, their loss unbalances the entire structure, producing a cascading deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness which

may result in complete failure and which will invariably leave the force vulnerable to further damage."


Centers of Gravity are best understood within the context of Levels of War. That is, there are, in increasing importance to our war efforts, tactical,

operational, and strategic COGs. Battlefield examples of each include:


Tactical COGs-- affect battlefield ops: soldiers, tanks, artillery, planes, ships

Operational COGs-- affect theater/campaign ops: theater-wide C4I, sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), theater logistical centers

Strategic COGs-- affect entire war effort: enemy industry, morale, leadership, alliance cohesion


Translating into Net.War terms, we have, for example (by far not inclusive!):


Tactical COGs: individual computers, spammer employees, individual mail drops, individual throw-away accounts

Operational COGs: spammer domains, non-rogue upstream ISPs, major e-mail addresses (critical ones used for spamming/spam-business

propagation), mailing lists (hopefully full of unprofitable disinformation scooped up from our sigs by their bots).

Strategic COGs: Spammer's reputation/image/prestige, spammer's financial security, spammer's legal status (hard to spam from jail), spammer's

physical health (hopefully worn down by the stress of dealing with our responses to his spamming; note that we DO NOT recommend or condone

direct 3-space attacks against perpetrator's car, business, or person-- the WORST thing we could do is create a martyr for the Spamming

cause, and thus justify the public's fear of 3-space harm induced by Internet participation!).


Our goal should be to obtain such high-quality CURRENT intelligence regarding the strategic spheres of the target that the most critical Centers of

Gravity float to the top of our streams of consciousness like dead fish. We then propose to shoot those dead fish simultaneously with terawatt laser




Tactical COA Analysis: Course of Action Analysis for the year 3000


"Now the crux of military operations lies in the pretense of accommodating one's self to the designs of the enemy."

--Sun Tzu, Art of War, XI: 56


What courses of action are open for us to translate our strategic and operational desiderata into cold, hard Spammer nads? First, it depends entirely

upon several contextual factors involving both ourselves and our enemy/enemies. If we are in actual de jure control of operations of a system (internet

service provider sysop, university sysadmin, information systems officer), then we have the capability to take decisive action against those users under

our authority. In most cases, however, including the case of usenet gurus, the best we can hope for is to persuade others who have such decisive

authority to take action. Examples include: domain-hosting sysops, upstream sysops, and, in the future perhaps, law enforcement authorities (once the

U.S. Congress amends U.S. Code Title 47, Sec 227 explicitly to include junk e-mail).


Let us not forget the Spammer's customers, who have the ultimate authority granted them by their feet (they can walk away and let his Spam-based

business wither on the vine).


What resources do we possess under our direct control which we may bring to bear on the conflict? Remember our Four Instruments of Power:




Ridicule/refutation (IRC, Usenet, Web, local and international media, op-ed pieces, word of mouth, books), enlisting support of lawmakers, enlisting

support of major ISPs (especially abuse sysops), organization amongst ourselves (beware infiltrators! always research new members for bona fides [hard

to fake DejaNews if you spammed until recently, but now come out as an anti-Spam crusader])

"A house divided against itself will not stand" -- A. Lincoln




There are seven archetypal missions that may be assigned to military forces:


Presence: 3-space-- Stationing troops overseas/ Net.War-- making manifest oneself as anti-Spammer to Usenet, Web

Show of Force: 3-space-- Rapid deployment of forces somewhere OTHER than FEBA (forward edge of battle area) [e.g., former yearly

REFORGER operations to demonstrate U.S. capability to deploy and sustain reinforcements to NATO theater of operations]/Net.War-- spam

cancellation campaign, spam customer education campaign (e.g.,

Demonstration: 3-space-- China launching missiles very near Taiwan with intent to threaten/Net.War--taking down a rogue NNTP server to

show that it can be done, S.P.(U.T.U.)M. Distributed Enlow Parody Site

Special Ops (including PsyOps, Unconventional Warfare, Civil Affairs, Maskirovka, Active Counter-Intel)--3-space-- Seal Team infiltration into

hostage situation / Net.War-- infiltration of our S.P.(U.T.U.)M. operative into Enlow's organization in the spring of 1997

Quarantine: 3-space-- Arms embargo in Bosnia, Oil export embargo in Iraqi theater of operations/ Net.War-- killfile campaign against spammer

Blockade: 3-space-- British blockade of Germany in WWII/Net.War-- Shunning of AGIS/UDP/retroadministration of rogue domain traffic

Forced Entry: 3-space-- Air war (Desert Storm, part 1), Marine amphibious assault (Iwo Jima), infantry invasion (Operation Overlord, 6 June

1944)/Net.War-- actual hacking of enemy websites/mailbombing/server takedown for the purposes of D.O.S., physical destruction of spamming

equipment [none of these latter examples is recommended, let alone legal].

Economic: 3-space-- freezing assets, MFN status, withholding of NGO (non-governmental organization) support via military ops/Net.War--

organizing customer boycott of rogue ISP/Spammer business, lawsuits to tie up spammer assets

Information: 3-space-- reconnaissance/recon by fire/intel/counter-intel/counter- counter-intel/disinformation campaigns/Net.War-- extreme

awareness of OPSEC (operations security)-- minimizing signature open to traffic analysis, minimizing tell-tale connections between 3-space life

and (don't advertise on rec.hiking that you are going on vacation next week if you are a major anti-Spammer);

COMSEC (communications security)-- frequent, nay, constant use of secure comm channels, strong encryption, and counter-intel measures

(active and passive); and INFOSEC (information security)--redundant, secure backups of useful IRC logs, Usenet threads [DejaNews headers do

NOT include paths], e-mail traffic; avoidance of keeping sensitive infowar files at work where employer can find them; avoidance of keeping

unencrypted text file on computer with names of associates [bugs in browsers can allow files on your computer to be read remotely]).


Given the accurate analysis of our target's strategic system, centers of gravity, Instruments of Power available to her; AND our own self-analysis of the

same factors, we can begin to map out detailed Courses of Action to take against our foes. This should probably be done with group input, so as to

maximize teamwork and minimize chances of collateral damage or counterproductive duplication of effort. Brainstorming, cooperative whiteboarding, and

role-playing (advocatus diaboli) come to mind as effective means of arriving at a host of potential COAs, which must then be evaluated before



How do we evaluate our courses of action?


1.Suitability-- will each COA get the job done?

2.Feasibility-- do we have the resources (Political, Military, Economic, Information) to get the job done?

3.Acceptability-- will our sysops/supervisors/consciences tolerate the COA?

4.Variety-- more than one COA is crucial for useful contingency planning

5.Completeness (who, what, where, when, how)-- are these factors defined EXPLICITLY?

6.Compliance-- will the COA comply with the law of the land and the culture/FAQs of the Net?


Once we have arrived at our chosen Course(s) of Action, we must resolutely apply our knowledge of parallel warfare and strategic and operational

centers of gravity to gain and maintain complete information dominance at all levels of warfare. Only once we have gained decisive strategic and

tactical advantage can we even consider to negotiate with our opponent. Our goal throughout is to arrive at the beginning: our envisioned

post-hostilities end state. All of our efforts should be focused on bringing our enemy to FIGHT where we are not and to COMPLAIN to those who have

already heard our side of the story. When we have completely eviscerated the enemy Leader's plan, all of his fancy suited lawyers and GHz-processor

spam-casting boxes will mean LESS than nothing-- they will be Exhibits A-Z at his trial for criminal stupidity in going up against Anti-Spammers who

have learned to Think Universally and Act Globally. PRAISE "BOB"!



Preliminary Conclusions:


by Unit V (the Hierophant)

Director, S.P.(U.T.U.)M. Counter-Intel Branch


We at S.P.(U.T.U.)M. have come very far since our most recent beginnings in early 1996, but far more needs to be added to the above analysis for it

truly to constitute a working manual of Infowar.


Specifically, more treatment should be given to:


Detailed modalities of Infowar power projection (should be classified to prevent misuse)

Medium-specific guidelines/pitfalls (IRC vs. Usenet vs. Web vs. E-mail vs. Internet2 vs....)

Internet-specific doctrinal guidelines-- Netiquette as the starting point for contextual Net.War operations (best written by a member of C/TINC)

A chapter on legal issues written by an actual lawyer who we can TRUST (may not have been born yet)

A chapter on the costs of Anti-Spam activism-- loss of time with family and friends, loss of hair, carpal tunnel syndrome, belly-aches from

laughing at stupidity of opponents, etc.

An ENTIRE chapter on Maskirovka/Anonymity as it applies to modern infowar. Don't leave AOL without it.


When all is said and done, we strongly hope that more will be DONE than SAID. If the principles outlined above are ignored, then Spammers surely will

win, the Usenet will implode, and the entire Internet will risk falling under the Draconian laws of Macon County, Georgia, USA. "Bob" forbid that this will

happen in our lifetimes-- but, remember, the only way for Spammers to triumph is for average netizens to do nothing.




Thank you.